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Cooperation risk and Nash equilibrium: quantitative description for realistic players
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Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo (USP), 14040-901 Ribeira˜o Preto, Brazil
The emergence of cooperation figures among the main goal of game theory in competitive-
cooperative environments. Potential games have long been hinted as viable alternatives to study
realistic player behavior. Here, we expand the potential games approach by taking into account
the inherent risks of cooperation. We show the Public Goods game reduce to a Hamiltonian with
one-body operators, with the correct Nash Equilibrium as the ground state. The inclusion of pun-
ishments to the Public Goods game reduces the cooperation risk, creating two-body interaction with
a rich phase diagram, where phase transitions segregates the cooperative from competitive regimes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its initial conception, Nash equilibrium (NE) has
been an iconic aspect in Game Theory [1]. It occurs
in a game whenever a player cannot improve her own
outcome by changing her current strategy, under the as-
sumption the remaning players mantain their respective
strategies. This must occur for all the players. Within
a limited set of rules, NE allows for a consistent analy-
sis of competitive-cooperative scenarios, taking into ac-
count the weight of individual rather than collective per-
formance. The sharp contrast between NE and coop-
erative solutions has been the central point in several
studies [2]. Indeed, it has been shown that cooperation
may emerge as a result of spatial inhomogeneity between
players, modelled with network theory, or a consequence
of more general rules [3–6].
Players’ behavior figures among the relevant aspects
governing the game outcomes. NE assumes players al-
ways adopt the best strategy available to them, reflecting
an extensive amount of rational thinking. Mixed strate-
gies have been sucessful to express players interactions
throught iterated games. However, Game Theory lacks
an exact model.The formalism of potential games over-
come this issue [7–9] by allowing players to adopt sub-
optimal strategies with a chance governed by a single pa-
rameter β. The formalism shares a strinking resemblance
with Statistical Physics.This similarity allows one to bor-
row tools, interpretations and results from this discipline
and use them into Game Theory analysis [9].
Despite the major advances put forward by potential
games, global rather than individual outcomes play a ma-
jor role in the quantitative analysis. While global vari-
ables and their minimization are sensible for physical sys-
tems, mostly due to a minimization principle, the same
cannot be said for Game Theory. This rationale suggests
the inherent risks undertaken by players with coopera-
tive behavior are underestimated. Hence, the resulting
equilibrium may deviates from the NE.
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Here, we address the role of NE in the potential game
formalism, and provide an analytical expression for the
risks associated with cooperation. Both are intertwined
and necessary to produce a more realistic description of
outcomes in Game Theory. The paper is organized as fol-
lows. We start employing the Public Goods (PG) game
as our toy model and develop the quantitative descrip-
tion of cooperation risk. Next, we extend our analysis
to include the effect of punishments. Phase transitions
explains the conditions necessary to create cooperation
among players.
II. COOPERATION RISK
In the Public Goods (PG) games [4, 10, 11], players
may forfeit the cost c from their own assets to a public
resource (collaborator), or keep c (defector). The public
resource is then increased by the factor b/c and, after-
ward, redistributed equally among all players (see Fig. 1).
Since players still receive their share regardless of their
own contributions, defectors lower the returns of collab-
orators while increasing their own earnings, thus estab-
lishing the cooperative-competitive scenario.
...
...
FIG. 1. Public goods (PG) game with N players. Each player
is assigned an unique identifier k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1. Collabo-
rators (white) increase the size of public resource by bearing
the entry cost c and then receive their shares in return (bi-
directional arrow). Defector (black) keep their assets but still
receive share (one-directional arrow).
Here, N players partake in a single PG game, with a
2single resource pool. Each player is labeled by a unique
identifier k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 and interacts with N − 1
different players. Individual player strategies (coopera-
tor, defector) are mapped into two-level systems in the
Dirac’s vector notation, namely, |1〉 or |0〉. The com-
bined strategies of N players creates a configuration vec-
tor |s〉 = |n0n1 · · ·nN−1〉, where either nk = 1 (coopera-
tor) or vanishes otherwise (defector). Thus, the number
of distinct configurations is 2N , with |00 · · · 0〉 being the
configuration with defectors (see Ref. [12]).
As usual, player payoffs are crucial to the mathemat-
ical description of the game. They are written in terms
of payoff matrices or operators. Payoff matrices are a
common and convenient way to express players’ earnings
and costs whenever the number of players is small, usu-
ally N = 2. For instance, see the payoff matrix of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma in Ref. [13] or [14]. However, as N
increases, the matrix representation becomes prohibitive.
Further insights can be obtained using operators, which
are defined by their action over the configuration vectors,
remaining tractable even for large N . In what follows we
select the operatorial description to assess the PG with
N players, employing the hat notation to distinguish op-
erators from numbers.
Our main concern is the action of operator nˆk over
an arbitrary configuration vector, nˆk|n0n1 · · ·nk · · · 〉 =
nk|n0n1 · · ·nk · · · 〉, which extracts the strategy of the k-
th player from the configuration vector. The operators nˆk
(k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1) hold additional properties, namely,
their eigenvalues are 0 and 1; and they are nil-potent
nˆ2k = nˆk, making them suitable building blocks to de-
scribe earnings from the various strategies available to
players. More explicitly, the operators that evaluate the
earning of the k-th player using cooperative strategies
and defective strategies are, respectively,
Πˆ
(C)
k =
[
b
N
N−1∑
ℓ=0
nˆℓ − c nˆk
]
nˆk, (1a)
Πˆ
(D)
k =
[
b
N
N−1∑
ℓ=0
nˆℓ − c nˆk
]
(1− nˆk). (1b)
Since there are only two strategies per player, the total
payoff operator regarding player k is
εˆk = Πˆ
(C)
k + Πˆ
(D)
k =
b
N
N−1∑
ℓ=0
nˆℓ − c nˆk. (2)
Notice that unlike Eqs. (1a) and (1b), Eq. (2) lacks prod-
ucts between operators, nˆknˆℓ, the so-called two-body op-
erators. Instead, Eq. (2) holds only one-body operators
and, thus, lacks interactions between different players.
In the formalism of potential games, the Hamiltonian
Hˆ = −
∑
k εˆk dictates the likelihood of each configura-
tion according to the Boltzmann distribution [7, 9]. One
of the key elements of the Boltzmann distribution is the
partition function Z = Tr(e−βHˆ), which depends on the
parameter β. In Statistical Physics, β is inversely propor-
tional to temperature. In the context of potential games,
β ∈ R+ serves as a scale that model the adoption of sub-
optimal strategy by players. With β = 0, players tend to
randomly adopt strategies, whereas β →∞ means play-
ers tend to adopt the optimal strategy (rational players).
More importantly, by introducing sub-optimal strategies,
the potential games formalism replaces mixed strategies
to describe the player dynamics. We reinforce that β
should be a representative value for a pool of players
much greater than N .
However, we argue Hˆ fails to correctly describe the
system. Consider the simplest case with N = 2, which is
formally equivalent to a particular instance of the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (PD). In this case,
Hˆ(PD) = −∆(nˆ0 + nˆ1) , ∆ = b− c, (3)
where ∆ is the net profit assuming both players co-
operates. Accordingly, the partition function is Z =
(1 + eβ∆)2, producing the average strategy per player
〈n〉 = (1/2)[1 + tanh(β∆)]. Note that β ≫ 1 and ∆ > 0
produce 〈n〉 = 1, i.e., rational players would cooperate
regardless of net profit as long as ∆ > 0. This result is
incompatible with the expected Nash Equilibrium (NE)
for N = 2. Therefore, Hˆ requires further corrections
to take into account the inherent risks associated with
cooperation.
Luckily, the NE requirements can also be used to model
the risk. The condition states the NE occurs whenever
a player cannot improve her own earnings by changing
her current strategy, regardless of the strategies of the
remaining players. We also note that the NE condition
implicitly assumes the various player strategies are uncor-
related, to accommodate the assumption of independent
strategy variations. Let 〈ε0〉 = (b/2)[〈n0〉+ 〈n1〉]− c〈n0〉
be the average earnings of player k = 0 in a single round
PG game with two players, with 〈n0,1〉 ∈ [0, 1]. The
NE condition reads ∂〈ε0〉/∂〈n0〉 = (b/2)− c, so that in-
creasing cooperation incurs into additional costs unless
c < b/2, with an analogous result for the other player.
Thus, the addition of linear operators nˆ0,1 with coupling
constants µ = µ0 = µ1 = c − (b/2) incorporates the
NE requirements into the desired PG Hamiltonian with
N = 2:
Hˆ(PD) = −(∆− µ) (nˆ0 + nˆ1) . (4)
It is worth noting that even though ∆ > 0, the coupling
∆−µ might acquire negative values. Hence, cooperation
becomes a viable strategy for rational players only if the
net return ∆ overcomes the inherent cost µ, associated
with cooperation. Therefore, we define µk as the cooper-
ation risk of player k, and µknˆk as the cooperation risk
operator.
The NE as the ground state of Eq. (4) can be gen-
eralized for arbitrary N . From Eq. (2) we evaluate the
cooperation risk µk = −∂〈εk〉/∂〈nk〉 = c − b/N . Due to
player translational invariance, µk ≡ µ and the coopera-
tion risk equals to the net difference between investment
3and minimum returns. Players in PG game aim for in-
creasing returns while avoiding risks, and are described
by the PG Hamiltonian
Hˆ = −
N−1∑
k=0
(εˆk + µknˆk) = −(∆− µ)
N−1∑
k=0
nˆk, (5)
with µ = c− b/N .
With Eq. (5) in hands, the partition function Z0 =∏
k
[
1 + eβ(∆−µ)
]
provides the average density of coop-
erators:
〈nk〉 ≡ n¯ =
1
1 + e−β(∆−µ)
. (6)
Hence, ∆ > µ favors cooperation for large values of β.
Conversely, ∆ < µ inhibits cooperation as players be-
come aware of risks. Regardless, 〈njnk〉 − 〈nj〉〈nk〉 = 0,
there is no correlation between players’ strategies.
III. COOPERATION RISK IN ASYMMETRIC
GAMES
Punishments are socio-economic measures input upon
players who disobey agreements. Punishments are spe-
cial because they are asymmetric, only affecting a specific
subset of players (defectors). They can be understood as
adjustment of rules to enforce cooperation. In what fol-
lows, we explore the PG games with punishment (PGP)
to create asymmetric payoff operators, introducing cor-
relations among players.
Let us quantify punishment as the reduction of defec-
tors’ earnings by the factor 0 6 γ 6 1. More specifically,
the defector payoff operator in Eq. (1b) is modified ac-
cording to
Πˆ
(P )
k = (1− γ)Πˆ
(D)
k , (7)
which inhibits non-cooperative strategies by decreasing
their effectiveness. The consequence from Eq. (7) appears
in the earning operator regarding the k-th player,
εˆk = −c nˆk +
b
N
(1− γ + γ nˆk)
N−1∑
ℓ=0
nˆℓ. (8)
Due to punishment γ, εˆk acquires two-body operators
nˆℓnˆk with coupling constant proportional to γ. Us-
ing the property nˆ2k = nˆk and the guidelines used in
the previous sections, we evaluate the cooperation risk
µ′k = µk − γ(b/N)
∑
ℓ 6=k
〈nℓ〉 for PGP. Thus, the PGP
Hamiltonian with N players reads
Hˆ ′ = −
γb
N
N−1∑
ℓ,k=0
nˆℓnˆk −
N−1∑
k=0
(h′k − µ
′
k) nˆk, (9)
where the one-body coupling h′k ≡ h
′ = ∆−γb differs by
−γb from its counterpart in the PG.
Equation (9) supports two remarkable properties.
First, punishment always decreases the risk associated
with cooperation: µ′k − µk = −γ(b/N)
∑
ℓ 6=k〈nℓ〉 6 0.
Lower risks favor cooperation among players, so that
one may conclude that punishments favor cooperation.
However, punishments also lower the actual value of h′k,
which is a primary component of players’ earnings. Pay-
off decrements δε due to punishment can be estimated
using meanfield approximation: δε ≈ −γb〈n〉[1 − 〈n〉],
where 〈n〉 ∈ [0, 1] describes the mean cooperation density
of players. Therefore, at the same time that punishment
produces a bias towards cooperations, payoffs decrease
by amounts proportional to γ. Thus, this quantitative
result recovers some findings first reported in Refs. [16–
18] for iterated games.
We can learn additional insights about the cooperation
risk µ′k by replacing the local average 〈nk〉 with the global
average, i.e., 〈nk〉 ≈ 〈n〉. Under the above approximation
µ′k ≈ µk − γb〈n〉(N − 1)/N. (10)
In fact, the approximation becomes exact for transla-
tional invariant systems as players become equivalent to
each other: µ′ = µ− γb〈n〉(N − 1)/N . Alternatively, for
the sake of practical applications, one may replace 〈n〉 in
Eq. (10) by n¯, yielding
µ′ = µ−
(
N − 1
N
)
γb
1 + e−β(∆−µ)
+ o(γ2). (11)
The second property of Eq. (9) concerns two-body op-
erators nˆℓnˆk. In general, the overall contribution at-
tributed to two-body operators depends on the punish-
ment parameter γ and on the local density of cooperators
〈nk〉. Eventually, cooperative strategies become compet-
itive against the inherent risk associated with coopera-
tion.
To simplify the notation, let the PGP Hamiltonian be
written as Hˆ = −α2Nˆ
2 − α1Nˆ , with Nˆ =
∑
k nˆk, and
couplings α2 = γb/N and α1 = (∆ − c + b/N)− γb(1 −
n¯q/N). The corresponding partition function reads
Z = Z0(x)
∞∑
k=0
(βα2)
k
k!
[
1
Z0(x)
∂2k
∂x2k
Z0(x)
]
, (12)
where x = βα1 and Z0(x) = (1 + e
x)
N
. A more use-
ful formulation for operators (∂/∂x)2k is obtained after
the variable change u = 1 + ex, so that (∂/∂x)2k =∑2k
ℓ=0
{
2k
ℓ
}
(u − 1)ℓ(∂/∂u)ℓ. The symbol
{
2k
ℓ
}
refers to
the Stirling numbers of second kind for ℓ 6 2k, or 0
otherwise [19]. By applying this expression for (∂/∂x)2k
to the term inside the square brackets in Eq. (12), one
derives the polynomial P2k(ξ) = (∂/∂x)
2k lnZ0, where
ξ = (1 + e−x)−1. More specifically,
P2k(ξ) =
N∑
ℓ=1
{
2k
ℓ
}
N !
(N − ℓ)!
ξℓ. (13)
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FIG. 2. Effects of punishment γ on N = 1024 players in a single public goods game. a) For b > 2c, positive values of γ
accelerate the adoption rate of cooperative strategies. The special case b = 2c states the equivalence between cooperative and
non-cooperative strategies, without punishment. The addition of punishments to the game dynamics, however, shifts players
towards cooperative strategies. b) Punishment retains its efficacy only for a short interval of values 2c > b. In the graphic, for
c/b = 0.75, punishment increases the adoption rate of non-collaborative strategies, surpassing the case without punishment.
The special point β∗ = 1.386 marks the point where the density of collaborators with punishment equals its counterpart without
punishment. Monte Carlo simulations are performed using Metropolis algorithm (107 realizations). Errors bars are estimated
using integrated correlation time [15].
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FIG. 3. Equivalence between density of collaborators between
γ = 1 and γ = 0 for N = 1024 players in PGP. The solid lines
represent 〈n〉 with γ = 1, whereas γ = 0 for dashed lines.
Vertical dashed lines indicate crossing between curves with
same cost c but different punishment parameters γ.
Further algebraic manipulations of Eq. (12), with y ≡
βα2, produce
Z = Z0(x) [1 + G(x, y)] , (14a)
G ≡
N∑
ℓ=1
N !
(N − ℓ)!
Cℓ(y)ξ
ℓ, (14b)
Cℓ ≡
∞∑
k=1
yk
k!
{
2k
ℓ
}
. (14c)
In the special case ℓ = 1, C1 = (e
y − 1) grows as the
exponential function. Under the asymptotic approxima-
tion
{
2k
ℓ
}
≈ ℓ2k/ℓ!, the functions Cℓ ≈ (e
yℓ2 − 1)/ℓ!
acquire a much more tractable form. Note that in
both cases, variations in y creates the same behavior
δCℓ = Cℓ + (e
yℓ2/ℓ!)δy + o(δy2).
Now, we turn our attention to the average density of
collaborators 〈n〉 = (1/Nβ)(∂/∂α1) lnZ. Numerical re-
sults from Monte Carlo simulations using Metropolis al-
gorithm are shown in Fig. 2. The PGP differs from PG a)
by accelerating player compromise rate either via collab-
oration or defection, depending on the values of γ and
c/b, for increasing player optimal strategy adoption β;
b) punishment γ promotes cooperation among players
for scenarios that would be otherwise dominated by non-
cooperative behavior. From the analytical point of view,
〈n〉 = n¯ for vanishing γ, by construction. In addition,
the density 〈n〉 satisfies the following inequality:
〈n〉 = ξ +
1
N
1− ξ
1 + G
N∑
ℓ=1
ℓN !Cℓξ
ℓ
(N − ℓ)!
6
G
1 + G
(
1 +
ξ
G
)
.
(15)
Thus, the density of collaborators meets an upper bound
which depends on ξ and the function G.
Consider the regime of high rationality and low re-
turns, i.e., β ≫ 1 and vanishing ξ. According to
Eq. (15), there exist three possible outcomes for 〈n〉,
namely, 〈n〉 → 0, if G → 0; 〈n〉 → 1, if G ≫ 1; and
〈n〉 converges to a finite number in the interval [0, 1] if
G converges to a finite value. These conditions are ev-
ident if we consider the largest term in Eq. (14b), i.e.,
G ∝ exp[βℓ¯(γℓ¯/N+α1)]. Since α1 can take negative (pos-
itive) values then G may vanish (diverge) for large val-
ues of βℓ¯. Therefore, a non-trivial relationship between
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FIG. 4. Phase transition in the public goods game with N = 1024 players, punishment parameter γ = 1 and b = 1. a) 〈n〉
converges continously to unity with inverse temperature β, for c = 0.664 (triangles). After a small cost increment, player’s
behavior change towards non-cooperation (full circles). The gap Λc ≡ Λc(β) converges to unity for large β. 50% of data omitted
for clarity. b) 〈n〉 decays as |β − β0|
−0.14(0)e−1.40(0)β with β0 = 2.175 (solid line).
〈n〉 and γ must emerge under the assumption that the
thermodynamic limit exists for PGP. Indeed, the largest
contribution in Eq. (12) provides the desired expression:
2βα2N〈n〉+βα1 = Ψ(N〈n〉+1)−Ψ(N−N〈n〉+1), (16)
where Ψ(z) is the Digamma function. Turns out that
for fixed γ, there exists a cost threshold c′ ≡ c′(γ) below
which punishment drives cooperative behavior. However,
c > c′ accelerates the defection rate, leading to the cross-
ing between the curves 〈n〉 and n¯. In fact, the crossing
occurs at the inverse temperature
β∗ =
ln 2
2c− b
, (17)
obtained from Eq. (16), as shown in Fig. 3.
Finally, there is the question concerning the value c′.
Fig. 4 depicts the behavior of 〈n〉 for c0 = 0.664b and
c1 = 0.665b, with N = 2
10 and punishment parameter
γ = 1. In the first case, punishment tilts the tendency
of players toward cooperation. More importantly, the
cooperator density 〈n〉 increases monotonically and con-
tinuously for increasing values of β. In the other case,
the new cost suffers a small increment over the previous
cost, c1 = c0 + δc with δc = 10
−3. However, the be-
havior of 〈n〉 changes rapidly after β > 2.08. In fact,
numerical data in Fig. 4 suggests 〈n〉 develops a disconti-
nuity Λc = 1, around c
′ ≈ 2/3 and γ = 1, with defection
being the preferred strategy for players that seek only
optimal strategies. The analogy with Thermodynamics
suggests the interpretation of c and 〈n〉 as the magnetic
fieldB and magnetization densitym, respectively, so that
(∂m/∂B)|β,γ = Λc. This evidence is compatible with
a first-order phase transition, separating a cooperative
phase (c < c′) from a non-cooperative phase (c > c′) for
rational players. Also, we point out that 〈n〉 changes very
rapidly with β. A careful analysis in semilog and log-log
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
2 3 4 50.1 1
〈n
2
〉
−
〈n
〉2
β
FIG. 5. Variance of cooperation density in log-log scale. The
maximum occurs around β = 2.2 for N = 1024, c = 0.665,
b = 1 and γ = 1, recreating the shape of λ letter, the hallmark
of λ-transitions. Error bars omitted for clarity.
scale shows 〈n〉 decays as |β − β0|
−ω1 exp (−ω2β), with
β0 = 2.175, ω1 = 0.140±0.002, and ω2 = 1.400±0.005 ≈
10ω1. More importantly, the fluctuation 〈n
2〉 − 〈n〉2 dis-
plays the well-known shape of λ-transitions in log-log
scale, as Fig. 5 depicts, with a peak around β ≈ 2.2.
The exact nature of the transition and whether it occurs
as single critical points or rather critical lines is not en-
tirely clear at this point, being well beyond the scope of
this paper.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a quantitative formulation of cooper-
ation risk is introduced to the analytical machinery of
Game Theory. Cooperation risk operators are one-body
6interactions and compete against payoff operators, and
ultimately provide the individuality component required
by the NE. Our numerical results show the PGP devel-
ops a first-order phase transition, separating a coopera-
tive phase from a non-cooperative phase. Another phase
transition is hinted along the rationality parameter β for
specific value of c/b and γ. However, the classification of
the phase transition and the whole range of paramaters
in which it occurs is still under study. In closing, our find-
ings lay out the groundwork for the investigation of more
complex games with competitive-cooperative dynamics,
while also taking into account the individual aspect re-
quired by the NE. We plan to expand this study and
evaluate the threshold cost c′ for arbitrary γ.
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